Israel attacks on Hezbollah leaders: explosives, walkie-talkies, and home solar systems exploded in Lebanon on Tuesday and Wednesday
On Tuesday and Wednesday, explosives hidden in thousands of pagers—and later walkie-talkies and other electronic devices—detonated across Lebanon in an apparent attack targeting the membership of the militant group Hezbollah. The operation, which has been widely attributed to Israel, killed at least 32 people, including at least four children and several hospitals workers, and injured more than 3,300 others. It flooded Lebanese hospitals with victims—members of Hezbollah and bystanders alike—who have in many cases lost eyes, fingers, and hands. In one instance Wednesday, walkie-talkies exploded at a funeral for three Hezbollah leaders and a child killed the day before, sending waves of panic through the crowd.
The home solar systems exploded less than two hours after the detonations began, according to Lebanon’s official news agency. Details of the alleged solar equipment attacks were still developing at the time of publication.
In a statement after Wednesday’s explosions, Lebanon’s Health Ministry said more than 300 people had been injured and nine people had died, with incidents being reported in several regions of the country. The Red Cross in Lebanon said more than 30 ambulances were used in the treatment of people injured.
Explosive device construction in Lebanon: The case of a terrorist organization that compromised the Hezbollah infrastructure using explosives is not a new phenomenon
The campaign to compromise key Hezbollah communication infrastructure with explosives was clearly elaborate and involved. The operation, which is widely believed to have been perpetrated by Israel, goes far beyond past examples of hardware supply chain attacks and may be a source of inspiration for future spycraft around the world. Sources tell WIRED that the scale and scope of the effort wouldn’t be easily replicated in other contexts. And, more broadly, the resources and precision involved in carrying out such an attack would be prohibitively difficult to maintain over time for key consumer devices like smartphones—which are used so widely and regularly scrutinized by researchers, product testers, and repair technicians.
“From what we are seeing, including images circulating on social media, the devices exploding are handheld radios, possibly an Icom model,” says Michael Horowitz, head of intelligence at the risk management company Le Beck International.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, there could be more of this in the future, not only targeting civilians but also other military actors. Supply chains could be exploited by adversaries if militaries are more reliant on commercial technology. “These systems are being sourced from all over the globe,” he says. This means that you also have global supply chains supporting them.
Exactly how Israel may have secreted explosive material into so many thousands of gadgets and remotely detonated those payloads remains far from clear. Theories about the operation have come to a consensus, though: that an Israeli intelligence agency likely carried out a supply chain attack that used a Hungarian front company to build devices with batteries laced with the explosive PETN—and even embedded metal ball bearings in pagers’ cases to increase the lethality of their payload—before impersonating a legitimate supplier and selling them in Lebanon.
Early theories that cyberattacks caused device batteries to overheat and explode have been ruled out by cybersecurity experts. The force of the blasts seen in on-the-ground footage would not be consistent with battery fires or explosions, especially given the small size of pager and walkie-talkie batteries.
At least 25 were killed and thousands were injured in a series of small explosions across Lebanon over the course of two days. These attacks have not come from rockets or drones. Instead, they’ve resulted from boobytrapped electronics—including pagers, walkie-talkies, and even, reportedly, solar equipment—detonating in coordinated waves. As details come into view of the elaborate supply chain attack that compromised these devices, citizens on the ground in Lebanon and people around the world are questioning whether such attacks could target any device in your pocket.
In the early 2000s, when he was growing up in Lebanon, the sonic booms created by the Israel Defense Forces’ planes in the skies above the country occasionally rattled his home and caused him and his family to sometimes sleep in the hallways. He thinks the psychological effect was intentional. After leaving Lebanon, he started sweating and shaking from the sound of fireworks.
“They’re wondering, is my phone being hacked? Is it going to blow up?” Kobeissi says something. “It’s worse than the sonic booms, because it’s completely novel, and it’s almost impossible to explain to them.”
Figuring out the purpose of the attack is still a topic of debate, as Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza strip continued, and tensions rose with Hezbollah. Bruce Schneier, a security and surveillance-focused author and researcher who teaches at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, says that the fact that the explosions were largely carried out by weaponizing communication devices is no coincidence. Schneier points out that the psychological effect of the operation, following years of Israeli government and military hacking of its adversaries’ smartphones and computers, is to sow paranoia in every last remaining means of communication and coordination that the country’s enemies possess.